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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5393
This paper explores how developmental and regulatory 
impediments to resource reallocation limit the ability 
of developing countries to adopt new technologies. 
An efficient economy innovates quickly; but when the 
economy is unable to redeploy resources away from 
inefficient uses, technological adoption becomes sluggish 
and growth is reduced. The authors build a model of 
heterogeneous firms and idiosyncratic shocks, where 
aggregate long-run growth occurs through the adoption 
of new technologies, which in turn requires firm 
destruction and rebirth. After calibrating the model to 
leading and developing economies, the authors analyze its 
dynamics in order to clarify the mechanism based on firm 
This paper—a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to understand the sources and policies for economic growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at nloayza@worldbank.org.  
renewal.   The analysis uses the steady-state characteristics 
of the model to provide an explanation for long-run 
output gaps between the United States and a large sample 
of developing countries. For the median less-developed 
country in the sample, the model accounts for more 
than 50 percent of the income gap with respect to the 
United States, with 60 percent of the simulated gap being 
explained by developmental and regulatory barriers taken 
individually, and 40 percent by their interaction. Thus, 
the benefits from market reforms are largely diminished 
if developmental and regulatory distortions to firm 
dynamics are not jointly addressed.    1 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large disparity among countries regarding the rate of adoption of even 
inexpensive technologies. To understand why, we focus on impediments to firm dynamics. 
When resource reallocation and firm renewal are not restrained, domestic enterprises are able to 
quickly incorporate the advances of a rising technological frontier.  In contrast, when the firms’ 
natural dynamics are obstructed (for instance by red tape or lack of human capital) a country’s 
ability to adopt new technologies can be severely handicapped, with negative consequences for 
its long-run income potential.  In this paper, we argue that a sizable fraction of the gap in income 
per capita between the U.S. and the typical developing country –over 50%-- is accounted for by 
these obstacles. Moreover, we find that not just removing the barriers, but removing them jointly 
is critical: about 40% of the estimated gap between the U.S. and the typical developing country is 
explained by the interaction of different barriers, and the rest by the sum of their individual 
effects.   
Starting with the work of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Caballero and Hammour 
(1994), and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), and more recently Restuccia and Rogerson 
(2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), a large body of literature shows the key role of firm 
dynamics in driving microeconomic productivity and, consequently, aggregate growth. The entry 
and exit of firms, involving the reallocation of resources from less to more efficient economic 
units, explain a substantial share of productivity improvements in the economy. Resource 
reallocation, however, implies costly adjustment: it requires the adoption of new technologies 
and the assimilation of production inputs by expanding firms, and the shredding of labor and 
capital by declining firms.  Without this costly process, economies would be unable to both reap 
the benefits of an expanding production possibilities frontier --the source of long-run growth - 
and absorb and accommodate negative shocks --the antidote to protracted recessions. 
Some of the impediments to resource reallocation and firm renewal are related to the 
development status of the economy, such as poor governance and lack of human capital, which 
exacerbate the contractual, financial, and adaptation costs of new technologies (see Caballero 
and  Hammour, 1998; and Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). Other impediments result from 
government’s distorting interventions in markets, such as excessive labor regulations, subsidies 
to inefficient sectors and firms, barriers to the establishment of new firms, and burdensome   3 
bankruptcy laws.  These distortions, and their implied misallocation of resources, have been 
blamed for the observed differences in growth experiences across countries. In their influential 
book, Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that gaps in  total factor productivity (TFP) among 
economies are produced by country-specific policies that restrict the set of technologies that 
individual production units can use. They ascribe them to monopoly-like denials of access to the 
best technology. Bernanke (2005) points to heavy regulatory burden as the reason why Europe 
lags behind the U.S. regarding productivity growth.  Likewise, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
conclude that the presence of government-owned firms with a degree of monopoly power, 
together with restrictions on the entry of new firms, diminishes competitive pressures that foster 
innovation and greater efficiency in the OECD.  Also focusing on industrial countries, Gust and 
Marquez (2004) present empirical evidence that economies with highly regulated labor and 
product markets face greater difficulty in incorporating information technologies and suffer from 
lower productivity growth.  
We analyze the process of technological innovation from the perspective of developing 
countries, that is, as an adoption process.  In contrast to the papers focused on rich nations, we 
take into account not only the policy-induced regulatory obstacles to firm dynamics but also the 
shortcomings inherent to underdevelopment, such as poor education and faulty governance.  
Moreover, we analyze how these types of impediments interact with each other to affect firm 
dynamics and, consequently, technological adoption.
1 As we explicitly model the connection 
between micro distortions and technology adoption, we provide an explanation for endogenous 
productivity changes.
2
                                                 
1 Jovanovic (2009) provides an alternative explanation for the lack of technological innovation among 
developing countries. He argues that licensing costs keep technologies away from developing countries 
since their productivity is too low to warrant paying the fee.  
   
2 Although this paper is specifically concerned with the issue of technological innovation, the mechanism 
that we study (i.e., firm renewal to take advantage of exogenous shocks) can be applied to other externally 
generated events. One of them is related to trade prices. If world conditions induce a terms-of-trade 
shock, only countries that can shift resources towards the most profitable sectors will be able to take full 
advantage of the shock. The current world economic crisis is another example. It has created an increase 
in the U.S. demand for certain products --such as low-end retail merchandising or fuel-efficient   4 
We first present some motivating evidence on the importance of developmental and 
regulatory characteristics for technological innovation.  Using the availability of personal 
computers and the number of internet users as proxies of technological progress, we study how 
they are related to governance, schooling and regulatory freedom in a large cross-section of 
countries. We find that these characteristics not only exert a positive independent effect on 
technological innovation but also complement each other in this regard.   
To understand these relationships, we then construct a stochastic general equilibrium 
model with heterogeneous firms. They differ with respect to their level of productivity, which is 
determined by their initial technology and history of idiosyncratic shocks.  Old firms tend to 
become less productive than young firms with more advanced technologies, and eventually leave 
the market. In doing so, they release resources that may be then used to form new firms, which 
acquire the leading-edge technology and enter the market. The technological frontier expands 
according to a stochastic and exogenous process. This intends to capture the way developing 
countries relate to technological advances, that is, as takers and users rather than developers of 
new technologies.  Modeling regulatory and developmental barriers to firm renewal as described 
below, our theory generates dynamics of adoption that are consistent with the data.
3
As customary in this literature, regulatory barriers are modeled as entry taxes, such as red 
tape and registration fees.  In turn, developmental barriers --such as poor governance and lack of 
education--  are modeled as a parameter that affects the adjustment cost of investment: the 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
automobiles--  that can benefit the most dynamic developing countries, even in the middle of  an 
international crisis. 
3 Samaniego (2006) also studies technological adoption within general equilibrium. However, that paper 
focuses exclusively on policy distortions: subsidies that enable plants to survive longer allow more of 
them to enter the stage of their life at which renewing their technology becomes optimal. Nonetheless, the 
economy spends a lot of resources on keeping alive plants that would otherwise have shut down, and this 
results in a reduction in both output and employment on the aggregate. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) 
use a similar model to account for cross-country differences in income per capita. They show that policies 
that create heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual producers can lead to sizeable decreases in 
output and measured TFP in the range of 30 to 50 percent. Hsieh and Klenow (2009), using micro data on 
manufacturing establishments, calculate manufacturing TFP gains of 30-50% in China and 40-60% in 
India if labor and capital inputs are allocated as in the U.S.   5 
salvage value of capital. The intuition for this assumption is that in conditions of 
underdevelopment, the value of capital depends on the informal knowledge and institutional 
networks associated to a particular activity.  In this case, capital cannot be easily transformed to 
serve as production factor elsewhere. As countries develop, however, the value of capital 
becomes more related to broadly applicable human capital (e.g., engineers that can work with a 
large variety of machines) and formal institutions (e.g., contracts that are enforced by the judicial 
system irrespective of economic activity, production sector, or geographic location). With higher 
development, capital can be retooled and reconverted, thus facilitating the process of 
technological adoption.  
According to this theory, differences in income levels are accounted for by differences in 
the speed of technological adoption (which determines the rate of growth acceleration).  The 
process is exacerbated when world knowledge expands continuously –economies that suffer 
from obstacles to innovation lag further and further behind the leading-edge technology, and 
thus, the leaders’ income per capita.  Using this framework, we calibrate the model economy to 
the U.S. and 107 developing countries around the world. The empirical counterpart of the chosen 
distortions is taken from the World Bank’s Doing Business database.
4
Then, we conduct simulation exercises to analyze the independent impact of 
developmental and regulatory barriers and the complementarity between them.  Consistent with 
the data, the model implies a slow adoption of new technologies by developing economies and a 
complementarity between the developmental barrier and the policy distortion. That is, the effect 
of regulatory freedom on technological innovation  –  and on aggregate productivity and per 
capita GDP– is larger the higher the level of economic development, and vice versa.  Our model 
accounts for over 50% of the income gap between the median LDC and the U.S, 60% of this gap 
is explained by the barriers individually and 40% by their complementarity.   
  
From these results, a clear policy implication emerges: reforms must be implemented 
jointly.  Economic reforms have been undertaken in developing countries during the last two 
                                                 
4 Some recent papers use the Doing Business database to simulate the effect of entry or exit costs on 
aggregate productivity across countries in industry-dynamics models. These papers, however,  do not 
stress innovation as a transmission mechanism, neither the complementarity between distortions. See 
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2010), Moscoso and Mukoyama (2010), and Poschke (2009).    6 
decades.  Frequently, however, they have been implemented without a comprehensive program, 
so when one reform is in place, other obstacles to reallocation remain.  Our model suggests that 
the benefits from  liberalizing international trade or privatizing publicly owned firms, for 
instance, are largely reduced when distortions are not uniformly eliminated.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some motivating facts.  Section 3 
presents the model, and Section 4 discusses its calibration.  Section 5 analyzes the dynamics of 
the model in order to highlight its firm dynamics mechanism.  Section 6 uses the steady-state 
characteristics of the model to provide an explanation for long-run output gaps across countries.  
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Some facts 
The differences  across countries regarding technological adoption are quite large.  
Studying 115 technologies in 150 countries, Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito (2006) conclude that the 
average dispersion of technology across countries is 3 times larger than the dispersion of income 
per capita, and for 68 percent of the technologies their cross-country dispersion is larger than that 
of income per capita. What explains these technological gaps? Most technologies have quite long 
gestation and adaptation processes, which makes it hard to identify the causes underlying their 
cross-country variation. The technologies related to the information revolution, however, offer an 
interesting exception:  a little over two decades ago, they were practically nonexistent almost 
everywhere; since then, they have been adopted at different rates throughout the world.  This 
may allow us to characterize the effect of certain initial conditions on recent adoption levels of 
these technologies.
5
                                                 
5 As mentioned above, the empirical exercise is reported only as motivation and suggestion of the type of 
results the model should be directed at. 
 Before proceeding to the econometric exercise, let’s consider some stylized 
facts about these technologies.  To maximize data quality and coverage across countries, we 
work with two indicators:  the number of personal computers per 1,000 people as proxy for 
technological progress in production and management processes; and the number of internet 
users per 1,000 people as proxy for the advance in telecommunications and information   7 
gathering. Figure 1 presents some regional comparisons on these technologies, both in levels as 
of 2003-04 and in changes between 2003-04 and 1994-96. 
Since these technologies are rather recent, the comparisons based on levels and changes 
are quite similar.  The OECD far surpasses any developing region.  The typical OECD country 
has 5 times more personal computers per capita than the typical East Asian developing country, 
10 times more than the typical Latin American or Middle Eastern countries, and about 50 times 
more than the typical Sub-Saharan African country.  Regarding internet usage, the gaps are 
smaller but still considerable.  The typical OECD country leads the typical East Asian 
developing country by 25%, while the other regions --Latin America, the Middle East, and 
specially Sub-Saharan Africa-- lag much farther behind. 
Figure 1. Technological Innovation per World Region 
 
Personal Computers (per 1,000 people)  Internet Users (per 1,000 people) 
   
 
Notes: 1. LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; MNA: Middle 
East and North Africa; EA: ASEAN+2 (South Korea and China) excluding LICs; OEC: 
OECD. 2. Median value of each country group.  3. Level indicates an average of 2003-2004 
by country, and change means the difference between the periods 2003-2004 and 1994-1996.  
4. Data on Personal Computers and Internet Users are from World Development Indicators. 
 
These regional differences are clearly related to income levels, providing some evidence 
on the importance of the developmental barriers mentioned above.  What about regulatory 
barriers?  Figure 2 shows some evidence that they are also potentially important.  Using the 



























































LAC SSA MNA EA OEC   LAC SSA MNA EA OEC  8 
them, we plot the group average of both personal computers and internet users per population for 
each year in the period 1990-2004.  Countries in the top quartile of regulatory freedom (countries 
with lower regulations) have much higher levels and speeds of adoption of both technology 
indicators.  Countries in the middle (inter-quartile) range of regulatory freedom also experience 
an increase over time but, having started their rise much later, show levels of technology 
adoption in the mid 2000s that are between one-third and one-half of those in the top quartile.  
Finally, countries in the bottom quartile of regulatory freedom start the adoption process much 
later and slowly than the others, resulting in enormous technology gaps with respect to the 
leaders.  
The evidence presented above is suggestive that both developmental and regulatory 
barriers play a role in explaining technological differences across countries.  For more careful 
empirical support, we now turn to cross-country regression analysis.  This will allow us to 
ascertain whether each proposed determinant of technological adoption exerts a statistically 
significant impact, even after controlling for the effects of the other determinants.  Moreover, 
this analysis will help us understand to what extent the proposed determinants complement each 
other regarding their effect on technological adoption.   
Table 1 presents information and results of the cross-country regression analysis.  The 
dependent variables are the two indicators of technological innovation, that is, personal 
computers and internet users, both normalized by population.  The explanatory variables are 
intended to capture the most relevant developmental and regulatory characteristics --the first 
represented by governance and schooling, and the second one, by business regulatory freedom.
6
                                                 
6 We make this selection based on the received literature on growth and technological innovation --see De 
Soto (1989) and Parente and Prescott (2000) on regulatory freedom; Olson (1982) and Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2005) on institutions and governance; and Lucas (1988) and Glaeser et al. (2004) 
on human capital and schooling.    
  
Specifically, for the quality of public institutions and governance, we use an index based on 
International Country Risk Guide indicators on the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and absence 
of official corruption.  For education and human capital, we use the Barro and Lee (2001) 
measure of average schooling years of the adult population. For regulatory stance, we use the   9 
Fraser Institute Index of Regulatory Freedom.  Appendix 1 provides additional information on 
definitions and sources of the three explanatory variables. 
Figure 2.  Technological Innovation and Regulatory Freedom 
Personal Computers by Level of Regulatory Freedom 
 
Internet Users by Level of Regulatory Freedom 
 
Notes: 1. Lines show average per group  (top quarter, inter-quartile range, bottom quarter) 
according to Regulatory Freedom as of mid 90s. 2. Data on Personal Computers and Internet 































































































>75pc 25-75pc <25pc  10 
The explanatory variables are all measured at the period 1994-96, while the dependent 
variables are measured at 2003-04. We lag the explanatory variables sufficiently to be able to 
consider them as pre-determined while still connected to the dependent variables.  The resulting 
samples consist of 83 and 90 countries for the regressions on personal computers and internet 
users, respectively.   
For each dependent variable, we run three analogous regressions.  The first estimates 
only linear effects, while the second and third allow for multiplicative interactions.  The linear 
regression results show that all explanatory variables carry positive and statistically significant 
coefficients, indicating that each of them independently is a relevant determinant of 
technological innovation.  More regulatory freedom, better governance, and higher schooling all 
lead to faster technological adoption.  Moreover, the results suggest that both developmental and 
regulatory barriers should be considered in any attempt to explain cross-country differences of 
technological innovation and, in particular, the backwardness suffered by some developing 
countries. 
In exercises not reported here, we included per capita GDP in the mid-1990s as an 
additional explanatory variable.  In the regression featuring only linear effects, the variables on 
regulatory freedom, governance, and schooling retained their sign and significance.  In the 
regressions featuring the multiplicative term, the coefficients on the interaction between 
regulatory freedom and each of the developmental indicators remained positive and significant.  
To some extent, per capita GDP captures all the measures of regulatory and developmental 
characteristics whose individual and interactive effects we want to disentangle.  Including per 
capita GDP in the regression would mostly obscure the interpretation of the direct and 
complementary effects, and this is why we decided to exclude it from the basic regressions.   
To assess both the direct effects of developmental and regulatory characteristics and 
whether they complement each other, we now consider the regressions where the regulatory 
freedom variable is interacted with, in turn, the governance and schooling variables.  These 
regressions show a clear and robust pattern:  the coefficients on all the multiplicative interactions 
for both dependent variables are positive and statistically significant. That is, governance and 
schooling complement regulatory freedom, compounding each other’s effect on the availability 
of personal computers and internet usage.   11 
Table 1. Technological innovation 
Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors 
 
Notes: 1. t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. * and ** denote 
significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. Constant terms are included but 
not reported. 2. Dependent variables are measured as average of the period 2003-04. Explanatory 
variables are measured as of mid 1990s. 3. Data on dependent variables are from World 
Development Indicators and on explanatory variables, as indicated below each variable. 
 
We can use the estimated coefficients to evaluate the effect of an increase in regulatory 
freedom on technological innovation.  For this purpose, we need to consider the coefficients on 
both the interaction term and regulatory freedom itself.
7
                                                 
7 The regression with interaction terms implies the following formula for the point estimate of the total 
effect of a change of regulatory freedom on either proxy of technological innovation,  
 Given that the total impact depends on 
ΔTech = (βREGFREE + βINT DEV) ΔREGFREE 
Where Tech represents either personal computers or internet users, DEV represents either governance or 
schooling, REGFREE indicates regulatory freedom, the symbol Δ denotes change, and the parameters 
βREGFREE and βINT are the estimated regression coefficients on, respectively, regulatory freedom and the 
Regulatory Freedom 25.48* -132.01** -67.26** 26.44** -77.05** -12.42
   (index of Credit, Labor and Business [1.97] [3.09] [2.25] [2.06] [2.66] [0.51]
    Regulation, by The Fraser Institute: higher, 
    less regulated; country average)
Governance 110.07** -138.22* 102.11** 83.02** -73.24 81.66**
   (simple average of ICRG Law and Order,  [7.39] [1.74] [6.86] [5.04] [1.59] [5.02]
    Bureaucracy Quality and Corruption indices:
    higher, better governance; country average)
Schooling 28.96** 33.94** -41.49 26.08** 28.53** -4.41
   (average schooling years in the population aged [3.66] [4.70] [1.42] [3.07] [3.61] [0.21]
    15 and over, from Barro and Lee (2001);
    country average)
Regulatory Freedom * Governance 39.85** 26.20**
[3.27] [3.44]
Regulatory Freedom * Schooling 12.67** 5.41*
[2.56] [1.68]
No. of observations 83 83 83 90 90 90
R-squared 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.75 0.77 0.75
Personal Computers Internet Users
(per 1,000 people) (per 1,000 people)  12 
the values of the variables with which regulatory freedom is interacted, it is not informative to 
provide a single summary measure of the effect.  Instead, we show how this effect varies with 
governance and schooling.  
Figure 3 presents the total effect on both personal computers and internet users of a one-
standard-deviation change in the regulatory freedom index as a function of the values of either 
governance or schooling.  In addition to the point estimates, the figure shows the corresponding 
90% confidence bands (constructed from the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the 
corresponding parameters). It shows that if governance and schooling are very low, an increase 
in regulatory freedom may not lead to higher levels of technological innovation. However, as 
countries advance in governance, institutions, schooling and human capital, they are more likely 
to take advantage of larger regulatory freedom to speed up the process of technological 
adoption.
8
                                                                                                                                                             
interaction  between  regulatory  freedom  and  governance  or  schooling.    Note  that  ΔREGFREE  is an 
arbitrary constant, which we set to equal one sample standard deviation of the regulatory freedom index, 
and DEV corresponds to any point in the set of values given by the sample range of either governance or 
schooling.  ΔREGFREE and DEV can thus be treated as constants.  Then, variance of the point estimates 
(of the effect of a given change of regulatory freedom on personal computers or internet users) can be 
obtained as follows,  
  What explains this pattern of complementarity between regulatory and developmental 
characteristics to achieve technological innovation?  The mechanism we propose in this paper is 
based on the incentives and costs of firm renewal.  We develop this mechanism in our model, to 
which we turn now.  
Var[ΔTech] = {Var(βREGFREE) + DEV 
2 Var(βINT) + 2 DEV  Cov (βREGFREE, βINT)} {ΔREGFREE}
2 
Using this variance, we construct the confidence intervals shown in Figure 3. 
8 The panels of Figure 3 show that for very low levels of governance or schooling, the effect of an 
increase of regulatory freedom on computer and internet adoption seem to be negative.  In additional 
exercises, we explored whether this negative result may be due to a non-linearity in the interaction.  
Indeed, when we interacted regulatory freedom with not only the linear term but also the square term of 
the corresponding developmental indicator, we found an upward-concave shape for the effect of 
regulatory freedom on technological adoption.  For very low levels of governance or schooling the slope 
of the effect of regulatory freedom on technological adoption was flat and close to zero; as the levels of 
governance and schooling increased, the slope of this effect increased markedly. For simplicity we only 
present here the simple linear interaction specification.       13 
  Figure 3: Innovation Effect of an Increase in Regulatory Freedom as 





Notes: 1. The solid lines show the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the index of 
regulatory freedom on personal computers and internet users, respectively; 2. The x axis 
represents the .05-.95 percentile range of, respectively, governance and schooling in the sample; 
3. Dotted lines are 90% confidence bands. 
 
 
3. A model of plant selection 
We develop a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous production units, vintage 
capital, and idiosyncratic shocks, based on Hopenhayn (1992), Campbell (1998) and Bergoeing, 
Loayza and Repetto (2004). There exists a distribution of plants characterized by different levels 
of productivity.  In each period, plant managers decide whether to exit or stay in business.  If a 
plant stays, the manager must decide how much labor to hire. If the plant exits, it is worth a sell-
off value. Every period the incumbents receive an idiosyncratic productivity shock. In addition, 
















































































































































































































   14 
increasing in the leading edge production technology. New plants are produced by a 
“construction” firm with a constant return to scale technology. 
In this context, the economy is characterized by an ongoing process of plant entry and 
exit, and the corresponding creation and destruction.  Plants exit if economic prospects loom 
negative.  They may also exit if their current technology becomes obsolete and, by selling their 
capital off, owners gain access to the leading-edge technology –Schumpeter’s process of creative 
destruction.  However, exiting is costly as capital loses some of its value in the process. These 
investment irreversibilities, as modeled by Caballero and Engel (1999), combined with 
idiosyncratic uncertainty, generate an equilibrium solution where plant owners rationally delay 
their exit decisions.   
We allow for exogenously imposed rigidities.  In particular, we study the effect of policy-
related and developmental barriers that alter firms’ decisions to leave or stay in the market.  
Governments are willing to impose such policies to reduce the volatility and short-run social and 
political costs associated to the entry – exit process or simply to collect revenues.  As mentioned 
above, we interpret the loss due to capital irreversibility as indicative of the economy’s level of 
development. Thus, micro dynamics are affected both by government and developmental 
barriers.  The larger these are, the lower the rate of technology adoption that developing 
economies engage in, and the larger their income gap with rich economies. Our simulation 
results are consistent with this fact: as the leading edge technology expands, barriers to the 
extensive margins dampen the reallocation process reducing short-run output losses at the cost of 
lowering adoption, productivity gains, and output trend.   
To relate our model to the existing micro dynamics literature, we refer to production units 
as “plants.”  However, we do not provide a theory of the firm or the plant.  In our model the size 
of the firm as a collection of production units is indeterminate, and, therefore, the modeled entry-
exit dynamics can occur either within or across actual firms or plants.  Nevertheless, to the 
extent that a firm or plant activities tend to consist of interrelated production units (or investment 
projects), we expect that there is a considerable correlation between production dynamics in the 
model and actual plant dynamics.   
The gap between the definition of production units in the model and in the data implies 
that our model abstracts from reality in other dimensions that are also relevant for the   15 
specification of parameters as well as for the interpretation of our results.  First, in the model 
only new plants invest, while in the data investment is carried out by both new and old plants. 
Second, in the model technological adoption requires firms to close down, while in the data 
incumbent plants may also adopt new technologies.  Thus, we conjecture that the magnitude of 
entry and exit implicit in the model is an upper bound of those in reality.  
In what follows we describe our model in detail.   
The model economy: The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous plants. A 
plant needs labor (n) and capital (k) for production of the unique good, which can be used for 
consumption or investment. This production good is the numeraire.  
Each plant's production function is given by  
                        (1) 
where A is aggregate productivity common to all the establishments (a scale factor), and  t θ   is the 
idiosyncratic productivity at period t. The notation  ) ( t t k θ  reflects the fact that the technology  t θ  
is embodied in the plant.  
Since technologies are characterized by constant returns to scale, we can restrict the size 
of all the plants to be equal to one unit of capital. Thus, capital goods are identified with plants 
so that investing one unit of the aggregate good yields a unit mass of plants.  Then, from now on 
) ( t t k θ  will represent the density of plants with embodied technology  t θ  as well.  
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=  is the aggregate effective capital stock. 
Capital embodying relatively low level of technology is scrapped as its productivity lags 
behind that of the leading edge technology. When a plant is retired, a unit of capital that is 




θ tkt(θt) ( )
1−α  16 
                       (3) 
where  t θ  is the endogenous cut-off level of productivity that determines the exit decision of 
plants and δ is the capital’s depreciation rate. 
Units of the production goods not consumed -- which are made up of investment and part 
of last period’s scrapped capital -- are transformed into new units of capital embodied with the 
leading edge technology.  That is, the initial productivity level of a plant born in period t is a 
random variable with a normal distribution  , where  t z represents the level  of 
leading edge technology. This stochastic variable follows a random walk with a positive drift µz 
according to  
.                    (4) 
This drift is the only source of long-run aggregate growth in our economy.  
Capital that is not scrapped receives an idiosyncratic shock to its productivity level before 
next period production process starts, according to  
                    (5) 
This idiosyncratic shock has zero mean and, thus, it does not affect the economy´s long-
run growth rate. The random walk property of the stochastic process ensures that the differences 
in average productivity across units of capital persist over time. Thus, at any t, the units of capital 
with more advanced technology have a lower probability of shutting down.  
  Summarizing, there are two sources of uncertainty: first, an idiosyncratic productivity 
shock,   
θ ε t , that determines the plant level decisions of incumbents. This shock does not alter the 
aggregate equilibrium allocation. Second, a leading edge idiosyncratic productivity shock,   
z
t ε , 
that governs the economy’s aggregate growth. Notice that plants, as they decide to stay or leave, 
choose between the following distributions:  
                        (6) 
                                 (7) 
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Plants last only one period. At the beginning of the period, firms decide production and 
hiring. The wage rate in period t is ωt , and the beginning and end of period prices of a plant with 
productivity θt are   and  , respectively. Within this setting, given the number of units 
of capital with productivity  t θ ,  , the employment assigned to each plant is given by  
                        (8) 
After production, firms decide which plants should be scrapped and which ones should be 
maintained in business.  Firms sell their production units and salvaged capital to the consumer 
and to a construction firm that produces capital embodying the leading edge technology. The 
construction firm, which buys  c
t I  units of the aggregate good from the producer, incorporates the 
leading edge technology at zero cost, and then sells it to consumers at the end of the period at a 
price per unit    1i
t q .  Profit maximization requires the price of the construction project i to be 
equal to the cost of inputs.  That is,  
  1 1 = i
t q .                           (9) 
This is the ex-ante price cost of capital, that is, before the realization of the productivity shock. 
The distribution of capital evolves according to the law of motion 
                     (10) 
Since asset prices equal discounted expected dividend streams, increases in the level of 
productivity raise these prices; and since the scrap value of a plant is independent of its 
productivity, only plants with productivity level below the threshold  t θ  exit the market. Thus, the 
marginal plant, that is, the one with productivity level  t θ , must have a market value given by the 
scrap value. The following equation states this condition. 
                         (12) 
Finally, the purchasing price of a unit of capital is determined not only by its marginal 
productivity, less any operating costs, but also by the price at which the capital left after 
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depreciation may be sold at the end of the period. Thus, for each  t θ , the purchase and sale 
decisions of capital units must be characterized by the zero profit condition:  
                          (13) 
where 1{⋅} is an indicator function that equals one if its argument is true and zero otherwise. 
This condition restricts the beginning of period price to be the return from using the capital plus 
the price at which it can be sold at the end of the period. The parameter π is a cost (fee and/or 
tax) per plant that the firm has to pay to be able to operate. Notice that π is independent of the 
productivity of the particular plant. With this we try to capture the impact of policy regulatory 
restrictions such as legal fees, government permits, and bureaucratic process, whose cost firms 
must suffer regardless their size or productivity.  
The  entry  cost  π  follows  an  AR(1)  process  with  autocorrelation  coefficient 
π ρ   and 
variance 
2
π σ .  The government´s budget constraint is guaranteed to be satisfied by imposing a 
lump-sum transfer to consumers.  
The remainder of the model is standard. There is a continuum of identical infinitely lived 
consumers who own labor and equity. Their preferences are given by 
                    (14) 
where  t c   and  t n − 1   are consumption and leisure, respectively, and β  and  κ  ∈  (0,1) are, 
respectively, the subjective time discount factor and the marginal utility of leisure.  Every period, 




  Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), this can be interpreted as an 
environment in which consumers, with standard utility functions, can work only a fixed number 
of hours or none at all, and they can trade employment lotteries.  Thus,   is interpreted as the 
fraction of the population that works.  
                                                 
9 If we run the numerical simulations using a standard log utility function for leisure, the main results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Definition of the equilibrium: A Competitive Equilibrium in this economy is a set of 
decision rules  , stochastic variables  , 
contingent prices  , and a vector    such that, given contingent prices, the 
transfer Tt , and production and government stochastic processes  , at each period t:  
1) Given the initial holding of capital, the representative consumer maximizes utility subject to a 










3) The intermediary satisfies, 
 
4) The government budget constraint satisfies, 
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5) Markets clear, 
                               (15) 
 
4. Numerical evaluation  
We analyze steady states under alternative distortions (produced by policy-related and 
developmental barriers) and, for each distortion, the transitional path following a leading-edge 
technology shock.  To approximate actual experiences and to assess the robustness of the results 
we simulate equilibria for a wide range of policy values.   
Numerical equilibria are solved using a three-step strategy. First, we compute the non-
stochastic steady state equilibrium variables. Second, we log-linearize the system of equations 
that characterize the solution around the long-run values of the equilibrium elements. Third, we 
apply the method of undetermined coefficients described in Christiano (1998) in order to recover 
the coefficients of the individual policy functions. Because the economy exhibits unbounded 
growth most of the variables are not stationary. Thus, when solving the equilibrium we scale the 
non-stationary variables by the long-run growth rate.  Then, a mapping takes the solution from 
the scaled objects solved for in the computations to the unscaled objects of interest.  
We can separate the parameters in four types: aggregate parameters  , plant 
specific parameters  , a policy parameter , and a developmental parameter  .  
In  what  follows  time  is  measured  in  years.  We  use  a  discount  factor  of  β  =  0.95, 
consistent with a net real interest rate of 5% yearly; the depreciation rate is set at δ = 0.06; and 
the share of labor incomes to output is set at α = 0.7, following Gollin (2002).  The aggregate 
parameters are calibrated as in a representative firm economy. Long-run growth is given by 
 which, since population is stationary, also represents the growth rate of income per 
capita. Thus, to have an annual trend growth rate of 2%, given α, we set  z µ  equal to 4.5%. The 
marginal utility of leisure, κ, determines the fraction of available time allocated to labor.  We 
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Plant specific parameters are proportional to those used in Campbell (1998) for the U.S. 
There are two reasons to do so.  First, long series of plant level data are not available for a large 
sample of countries.  Second, economies in our model are equal in all respects except specific 
parameters related to policies and development.  We use the U.S. as our undistorted long-run 
developed benchmark. The parameters used by Campbell (1998) do a good job generating a 
distribution of firm’s productivities for the U.S. economy, but they fail to capture the larger 
dispersion of individual productivities observed in developing economies (as reported by 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2004). Hence, in order to find meaningful values for the 
productivity threshold (i.e., values of θ   with strictly positive measure) we must use a 
substantially larger variance.  We choose values for  θ σ  and σ  twice as large as those used by 
Campbell (1998). 
Regarding the policy-related and developmental barriers, we calibrate their corresponding 
parameters, π and s, to match data from the World Bank Doing Business database.
10
                                                 
10 On entry costs, this is the same source used by the Fraser Institute to construct their index of regulatory 
freedom.  
  We choose 
to use data for 2007 (in part to ensure that GDP figures are not preliminary).  Two specific 
indexes are of interest for the purpose of our paper: the cost of starting a business and the 
percentage of the initial investment that is preserved (or recovered) when a firm exits the market.  
The mapping between these indexes and the model’s parameters, π and s, is not exact, but we 
believe it is reasonably appropriate.  The mapping is quite close when we interpret the model in a 
limited  perspective,  according  to  which  π  and  s  simply represent entry and exit costs, 
respectively.  Admittedly, the mapping becomes weaker when we interpret the model and its 
parameters more broadly,  that  is,  when  we  associate  π  with  policy  barriers  and  s  with 
developmental constraints.  In reality, both indicators from Doing Business have elements of 
policy and development imbedded in them.  However, the design of the Doing Business 
indicators makes the entry costs mostly driven by policy barriers, that is, dictated by de jure 
regulations, while the recovery rate is determined to a large extent by the confluence of de facto 
governance and human capital factors.  We acknowledge that the indicators from Doing Business 
are neither complete nor exclusive proxies of the model parameters.  However, for the purpose of   22 
the application and interpretation of the model, they are the best in terms of representing, first, 
the entry and exit margins, and, second, the policy and developmental barriers to firm dynamics.   
Table 2. Selected Statistics, Doing Business 
  Entry    Exit 
  Fees 




  Recovery rate 
(cents per 1$) 
Average  106.3  46.2    30.8 
Median  24.3  34.0    27.3 
Minimum  0.0  2.0    0.0 
Maximum  6,375.5  694.0    92.7 
St. deviation  491.3  59.6    24.9 
P90  203.9  87.5    75.3 
P10  3.21  11.7    0.0 
U.S.A.  0.8  6    77* 
Median LDC (Egypt)  68.8  19    16.6* 
Median LAC (Brazil)  9.9  152    12.1* 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business, 2007 
*In the simulations, the recovery rates of the U.S., Egypt, and Brazil are 
rounded to the nearest number used in the simulation grid. As shown in Table 
3, they are, respectively, 77.5, 17.5, and 12.5.  
 
Table 2 presents selective statistics on entry barriers and recovery rates for the 183 
countries included in the Doing Business database.  It also presents the values corresponding to 
the U.S. (our benchmark efficient economy) and the median LDC (according to income per 
capita).  Differences across countries are large.  The most entry-regulated economies (90
th 
percentile) have a direct cost to start a business of about 200% of GDP.  That is around 60 times 
larger than the cost of the least entry-regulated ones (10
th  percentile).  Recovery rates after 
exiting are 0% and 75% for the least advanced (10
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Table 3.  Parametric specification 
Aggregate parameters  Parameter  Value 
Discount factor  β  0.95 
Fraction of steady state hours worked   N  0.33 
Labor share  α  0.7 
Depreciation rate  δ  0.06 
Leading edge technology drift  µζ  0.045 
Plant level parameters     
St. deviation of shock to incumbents  σθ  0.06 
St. deviation of shock to startups  σ  0.06 
Simulation parameters     
Leading edge technology shock  εζ  0.045 
Efficient economy – US     
  Recovery rate (development level)  s  0.775 
  Entry barrier (policy regulation)  π  0 
Developing economies   
  Median LDC – Egypt  
   
  Recovery rate (development level)  s  0.175 
  Entry barrier (policy regulation)  π  0.2 (0.74 GDP pc) 
  Median LAC – Brazil      
  Recovery rate (development level)  s  0.125 
  Entry barrier (policy regulation)  π  0.15 (0.52 GDP pc) 
 
 
The link between the recovery rates from Doing Business and the parameter s in the 
model is direct and correspond one-to-one.  Both represent the fraction of initial investment that 
is not lost when the firm closes.  On the other hand, the connection between the entry barrier data 
from Doing Business and the parameter π in the model is more involved.  First, we need to 
convert the two measures (fees and time) into the same unit.  As an approximation, we do it by 
assuming that the fraction of days in a year that takes to open a business corresponds to the 
fraction of GDP per capita lost in the process.  Then, we add this measure to the fees, already 
expressed as ratio to GDP per capita.  The second step is to transform this cost as ratio to GDP   24 
per capita to a cost in terms of the price of capital (see equation 13).  The transformation is not 
linear and depends, among other things, on the prevailing recovery rate s.  For instance, an 
economy with a recovery rate of 0.175 and an entry barrier of 0.74 of GDP (corresponding to the 
median LDC) would have a parameter π equal to 0.2.  The U.S., having about 0.02 of GDP as 
entry barrier and 0.775 of recovery rate, would have π = 0.
11
Table 3 summarizes the main parameters used in the calibration and simulations 
presented below.  In particular, it presents the corresponding values for the entry barrier π and 
the recovery rate s  for the U.S., as the benchmark efficient economy; for the median LDC 
according to income per capita, which in 2007 happens to be Egypt, and the median Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) country, which in 2007 is Brazil. 
     
 
5. Dynamics: A mechanism based on firm renewal 
  In this section, we simulate the dynamics of the model for the efficient economy (the 
U.S.) and for two developing countries, the median LDC (Egypt) and the median LAC (Brazil).  
Our purpose is to clarify the mechanism through which both development and regulatory barriers 
affect growth and output per capita levels.  As emphasized in the paper, this mechanism consists 
of technological adoption through firm renewal.  
Figure 4 shows the impulse response of firm entry, firm exit, aggregate capital, aggregate 
labor, TFP, and output to a positive shock of 4.5% to the leading technology (a shock of a one-
drift size, equivalent to a permanent increase in long-run growth rate of about 2 percentage 
points).  The impulse responses are presented for the U.S. and the two developing economies, 
Egypt and Brazil.  Firm entry and exit are calculated as ratio of entry/exit net capital over GDP, 
and their impulse responses correspond to the after-shock percentage point deviations of this 
ratio.  For the remaining variables, the impulse response is presented as the after-shock deviation 
with respect to the original steady-state growth rate.   
Firm entry jumps more rapidly and remains at a significantly higher level in the efficient 
economy than in the typical developing economies for the first 10 periods, slowly converging to 
the initial ratio with respect to GDP.  Firm exit shows a similar pattern, but in this case the 
                                                 
11 The full mapping is not provided here to save space but is available upon request.   25 
differences between the U.S. and the developing economies are much more pronounced.  Firm 
exit in the U.S. is much larger than in the typical developing economies and for a longer period 
of time.  The stronger response of firm exit than entry is in part due to the larger difference 
regarding (after exit) recovery rates than entry barriers between the two types of countries.   
The result of the more active firm dynamics in the efficient economy can be seen in the 
remaining panels.  Capital grows substantially more in the efficient economy than in the 
developing ones but only in the first few periods.  Since at the end both types of economies fully 
adopt the new technology, more adoption through capital accumulation occurs later on in the 
developing economies.
12
The effect of the more active firm renewal is strikingly seen in the impulse response 
associated to TFP.  In fact, TFP grows substantially higher in the efficient than in the developing 
economies for the first periods. Later on, the latter economies have somewhat higher TFP 
growth, as they catch up on the adoption of the new technology.  The impulse response of GDP 
reflects the responses of the components of the production function, with some predominance of 
the TFP response. GDP grows much more rapidly in the efficient than developing economies 
during the first periods, with a reversal of smaller magnitude in the following years. The 
difference in GDP growth rates in favor of the efficient economy is less pronounced than the 
corresponding difference in TFP growth rates. This is due to the stronger initial response of labor 
in developing countries, as well as their stronger response of capital in subsequent periods.  
  Interestingly, labor response is more intense in the developing than the 
efficient economy during the first few periods.  This reverses after approximately 5 periods, 
gradually converging towards the new steady state.  The stronger labor response in developing 
economies is partly to compensate for their weaker capital and productivity response. 
   
                                                 
12 The “inevitable” full adoption of new technologies is implicit in the assumption that long run growth 
(µz) is exogenous and equal in both economies. We think that this assumption reflects accurately the 
sources of growth, since, sooner or later, all technological innovations are worldwide adopted.   26 
Figure 4: Impulse Responses 
Entry  Exit 
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6. Steady-state: Explaining long-run per capita output gaps   
Our theory proposes a partial explanation for the observed differences in output (income) 
per capita across countries –some countries are poorer than others because their economies suffer 
from barriers to the adoption of new technologies.
  13
As the cost of entering and exiting the economy increases, the distribution of firms is 
altered such that too many inefficient firms remain in the market and too few potentially more 
efficient firms enter the market.  As a result, both the reshuffling of resources from less to more 
efficient firms and the adoption of the leading-edge technology are impeded.  The mechanism 
does not require new technologies to be fully blocked since slowing down this adoption process 
is enough to render significant income differences across countries.  New technologies are 
eventually fully adopted by all countries, but what matters to account for income disparities at a 
moment in time is the difference in the speed at which they are adopted. 
  Some barriers are the product of the 
country’s underdevelopment itself, while others consist of policy regulations that reduce 
competition and raise the costs of firm formation.  In our theory, any policy that affects current 
and expected productivity by interfering with the natural process of birth, growth, and death of 
firms, will have a detrimental effect on aggregate growth.  
In order to illustrate the potential impact that the barriers to technological adoption can 
have on long-run output differences across countries, we use the model and its calibration to 
simulate the steady-state output of a set of economies with given policy and developmental 
barriers relative to the output of the U.S., our benchmark efficient economy. The results are 
illustrated in Figure 5.   
Three results deserve to be highlighted.  First, worsening entry barriers (higher π) or 
poorer recovery rates (lower s) decreases steady state output with respect to the leader, with this 
effect being larger when the corresponding parameters are close to those of the efficient 
                                                 
13 We indistinctly refer to income and output as GDP.  And, unless otherwise noted, GDP is presented in 
per capita terms.  As it is evident from the feasibility condition in equation (15), the analogous to GDP 
per capita in our model economy is Y+S, not Y by itself. That is, the “transformation” of plants back into 
the numeraire is a production process itself, which entails the loss of 1-s parts of the original components 
of the plant. Thus, we refer to GDP per capita as Y+S in the model economy.   28 
economy.  In other words, when the situation with respect to either entry barriers or recovery 
rates is already bad, worsening them would have smaller negative impact.   
Figure 5: Output Relative to Efficient Economy (U.S.) 
For given recovery rate (s) 
 
For given entry barrier (π) 
 
 
The second result is that the model generates substantial income heterogeneity.  With 
respect to the efficient economy (π = 0 and s = 0.775), movements in the entry barrier or the 
recovery rate can lead to output ratios as low as 40%.  This is obtained considering a limited 
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the extreme cases found in the world sample, the differences with respect to the leader would be 
predicted to be much larger. 
The third interesting result can be associated with the complementarity between policy 
and developmental barriers (or, more literally in the model, the interaction between different 
distortions to efficient technological adoption).  In Figure 4, we plot the effect of entry barriers 
(upper panel) and the effect of recovery rates (bottom panel) for four different values of each 
other parameter. This shows that improving a country’s developmental characteristics 
(increasing s) when its policy barriers (π) are kept at a high level has almost no impact on GDP 
per capita. Likewise, reducing policy barriers when the economy exhibits a low level of 
development has a small impact on GDP per capita.  On the other hand, either reducing policy 
barriers when the economy has a high level of development or  improving developmental 
characteristics when policy barriers are low has a sizable effect on GDP per capita.  
Table 4.   Changes in output with respect to the initial level 
                 s      
      π 










0.9 to 0.7  10.4%  9.5%  9.3%  9.0%  8.7% 
0.7 to 0.5  13.5%  12.6%  12.1%  11.4%  10.9% 
0.5 to 0.3  19.4%  18.4%  16.9%  15.7%  14.7% 
0.3 to 0.1  35.8%  32.6%  28.2%  24.9%  22.6% 
0.1 to 0  39.2%  29.6%  23.4%  19.4%  16.8% 
 
 
Table 4 provides additional evidence of this positive interaction between developmental 
and policy margins.  It presents the impact of parameter changes on output as a proportion of its 
original level. The higher the s and the lower π, the higher the output gains are, as a proportion of 
the original output level. For instance, starting from an economy with π = 0.1 and s = 0.9, 
moving towards an economy with no entry barriers generates a 39.2% output gain.  But if s = 
0.1, the same entry barrier change would produce a gain of only 16.8% of the original output 
level.    Moreover,  since  an  economy  with  lower  π  and  higher  s  has larger output level, the 
potential absolute and proportional gains in output are larger the closer to the leading edge 
technology the economy is.    30 
The output effect of the change in policy or developmental barriers is true everywhere:  
the better one margin, the larger the value of the theoretical derivative of output with respect to 
the other margin.  This complementarity is consistent with the empirical findings presented in 
Section 2.  A policy implication follows: the benefits from reforms can be considerably reduced 
if they are not uniformly addressed.  
Having analyzed the theoretical effect of policy and developmental barriers on potential 
output, we can next quantify their effect on explaining the observed output gaps between the 
benchmark efficient economy (the U.S.) and developing countries around the world.  First, using 
the model and each country’s observed entry cost and recovery rate, we simulate its predicted 
output gap with respect to the U.S.  Second, we compare the simulated with the actual output gap 
per country in order to assess the model’s ability to account for observed income differences. 
Finally, we analyze the contribution of policy barriers, developmental  constraints, and their 
complementarity in explaining the simulated output gap between each developing country and 
the benchmark economy.  
For the interested reader, Appendix II presents the country-specific results on long-run 
output gaps corresponding to 107 developing countries.  Here, for brevity, we discuss only the 
results related to the median LDC (Egypt) and median LAC (Brazil).  They are summarized in 
Table 5. 
Table 5 (and the accompanying Appendix II) presents some interesting results.  From 
them,  two deserve special attention.  First, despite the model’s narrow emphasis on growth 
through technological adoption and firm renewal, its mechanism can explain a substantial 
fraction of the GDP gap of developing countries with respect to the U.S.  In fact for the typical 
less-developed country, the model explains over 50% of the actual GDP gap with respect to the 
leading developed economy.  Considering the full sample of developing countries, the median 
explanation performance of the model is nearly 50%.   
A second finding is not less interesting.  About 40% of the simulated gap is accounted for 
by the complementarity of policy and developmental barriers.  This is the case for the typical 
LDC and typical LAC.  It is also very similar to the median contribution from the interaction of 
policy and developmental barriers obtained from the full sample of developing countries.  The 
remaining 60% is, of course, explained by each barrier separately.  Their proportional   31 
contribution varies from country to country, depending on the relative importance of entry 
barriers and recovery rates.  For the median LDC, entry barriers are somewhat more important 
than recovery rates, accounting for 37% and 22%, respectively.  This is approximately the same 
as the median values obtained from the full sample of developing countries.   
 
Table 5.  Explaining Long-Run Output Gaps 




Simulated GDP gap with respect to U.S.*  0.47  0.44 
Simulated / Actual GDP gap with respect to U.S.  52%  56% 
Contribution to simulated output gap:     
Individual effects     
     Recovery rate (development level) 






Complementarity  42%  40% 
* Proportional output gap with respect to the U.S.   obtained from the model. 
 
 
7. Concluding comments 
This paper links microeconomic rigidities and technological innovation in order to 
provide a theory, albeit partial, of aggregate economic development.  Since world knowledge 
expands continuously, economies that keep obstacles to innovation permanently lag the leading-
edge technology, and thus, the leaders’ income per capita. In particular, when government-
imposed regulations or developmental barriers deter the ongoing process of resource reallocation 
and firm creation and destruction, then technological adoption becomes sluggish and the 
economy fails to generate enough growth to close the developed-developing gap. Even though 
all economies end up fully adopting the new technologies, poor economies are always behind. 
These regulatory and developmental barriers not only exert an independent effect on 
technological innovation but also complement each other in this regard:  policy-induced   32 
regulatory obstacles to  firm dynamics limit reallocation, and the shortcomings inherent to 
underdevelopment, such as poor education and faulty governance, exacerbate the costs of firm 
renewal. That is, the effect of regulatory freedom on technological innovation is larger the higher 
the level of development, and vice versa.   
In spite of its single focus on technological adoption and firm renewal, our model 
explains a substantial fraction of the per capita GDP gap between leading and less developed 
countries.  For instance, it explains over 50% of the income per capita gap between the U.S. and 
the typical LDC, with 60% of this simulated gap being explained by policy and developmental 
barriers individually and 40% by their complementarity.  
These results suggest further research on other policy issues, such as the timing of the 
reforms. Economic reforms have been extensively undertaken by developing economies during 
the last two decades. However, most reforms are implemented sequentially, so when one reform 
is in place other obstacles to reallocation remain.  Our theory suggests that the benefits from 
these market reforms have been substantially reduced when distortions have not been uniformly 
eliminated.  A corollary follows –since resource reallocation implies costly adjustment, 
sequentially implemented reforms may end up being reverted in developing economies. 
   33 
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Appendix 1. Definitions and sources of explanatory variables 
       
 
   
Definition and Construction  Source 
Regulatory Freedom  An index ranging 0 to 10 with higher values indicating less regulated. It is  
a comprehensive index that captures three areas of regulatory restraints:  
(i) Domestic credit market; (ii) Labor market; and (iii) Business activities.  
Each area also has five sub-components. The area of credit market is  
composed of (a) Ownership of banks; (b) Competition; (c) Extension 
credit; (d) Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to  
negative real interest rates; and (e) Interest rate controls. The measure of  
labor market regulations is based on (a) Impact of minimum wages; (b)  
Hiring and firing practices; (c) Share of labor force whose wages are set  
by centralized collective bargaining; (d) Unemployment Benefits; and (e)  
Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel. Regulation of business  
activities is composed of following indicators: (a) Price controls; (b)  
Administrative Conditions/Entry of New Business; (c) Time with  
government bureaucracy; (d) Starting a new business; and (e) Irregular  
payments. A score of 1995 by country is used. 
Gwartney and Lawson  
(2006), The Fraser  
Institute. Data retrieved  
from  
www.freetheworld.com. 
Governance  An index ranging 0 to 5.5 with higher values indicating better  
governance. It is a simple average of Law and Order (6 points),  
Bureaucracy Quality (4 points) and Corruption (6 points) indices. Law  
and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising  
0 to 3 points. Assessment of Law focuses on the legal system, while Order  
is rated by popular observance of the law. The rating of Bureaucracy  
Quality is based on the strength and established mechanism of the  
bureaucracy to govern without drastic changes in policy and to be  
autonomous from political pressure. Corruption covers a wide range of  
forms of corruption in the political system, from bribes to excessive  
patronage, nepotism and secret party funding. An average of 1994-1996  
by country is used. 
ICRG. Data retrieved from  
www.icrgonline.com. 
Schooling  Average schooling years in the population aged 15 and over. A score of  
1995 by country is used. 
Barro and Lee (2001). 
Variable   38 
Appendix II: Explaining Output Differences between the U.S. and Developing Countries 
 
 
* Proportional output gap with respect to the U.S.   obtained from the model. 
 
 
   
s π complementarity
Algeria 0.425 0.075 0.33 39% 38% 35% 28%
Angola 0.100 0.900 0.65 74% 5% 52% 42%
Argentina 0.350 0.075 0.34 49% 41% 30% 29%
Armenia 0.425 0.025 0.26 29% 67% 17% 16%
Azerbaijan 0.325 0.075 0.35 42% 42% 28% 29%
Bangladesh 0.250 0.175 0.44 46% 23% 38% 39%
Belarus 0.325 0.125 0.40 52% 29% 37% 35%
Belize 0.625 0.200 0.40 47% 9% 72% 20%
Benin 0.225 0.475 0.57 59% 8% 50% 41%
Bolivia 0.375 0.400 0.53 59% 8% 56% 35%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.350 0.150 0.41 49% 24% 41% 35%
Botswana 0.600 0.125 0.34 47% 16% 62% 22%
Brazil 0.125 0.150 0.44 56% 29% 31% 40%
Bulgaria 0.350 0.050 0.32 41% 52% 23% 24%
Burkina Faso 0.275 0.325 0.52 53% 12% 48% 40%
Cameroon 0.250 0.350 0.53 55% 11% 48% 41%
Chile 0.225 0.050 0.34 49% 56% 18% 25%
China 0.325 0.075 0.35 40% 42% 28% 29%
Colombia 0.575 0.100 0.32 39% 22% 55% 23%
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.100 0.900 0.65 66% 5% 52% 42%
Congo, Rep. 0.200 0.350 0.53 58% 12% 46% 42%
Costa Rica 0.175 0.125 0.42 55% 33% 30% 38%
Cote d'Ivoire 0.350 0.350 0.52 54% 10% 53% 37%
Djibouti 0.150 0.500 0.58 61% 9% 48% 43%
Dominican Republic 0.100 0.150 0.44 53% 29% 30% 41%
Ecuador 0.175 0.150 0.44 52% 28% 33% 39%
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.175 0.200 0.47 52% 22% 37% 42%
El Salvador 0.300 0.225 0.47 54% 17% 45% 39%
Ethiopia 0.325 0.150 0.42 42% 24% 40% 36%
Fiji 0.200 0.125 0.42 46% 32% 31% 37%
Gabon 0.150 0.125 0.42 61% 33% 29% 38%
Gambia, The 0.175 0.600 0.60 62% 7% 51% 42%
Georgia 0.275 0.050 0.33 37% 55% 20% 25%
Ghana 0.250 0.200 0.46 47% 20% 40% 40%
Guatemala 0.275 0.175 0.44 49% 22% 39% 38%
Guinea 0.175 0.425 0.56 57% 10% 47% 43%
Guyana 0.175 0.275 0.50 54% 16% 41% 43%
Haiti 0.100 0.625 0.61 62% 7% 49% 44%
Honduras 0.200 0.200 0.46 51% 21% 38% 41%
India 0.125 0.225 0.48 52% 20% 37% 43%
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* Proportional output gap with respect to the U.S.   obtained from the model. 
s π complementarity
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.200 0.050 0.35 46% 57% 18% 25%
Jamaica 0.650 0.050 0.21 26% 30% 55% 16%
Jordan 0.275 0.200 0.46 51% 20% 41% 39%
Kazakhstan 0.400 0.050 0.30 40% 50% 26% 24%
Kenya 0.325 0.175 0.43 45% 21% 42% 37%
Kyrgyz Republic 0.150 0.050 0.36 38% 58% 16% 25%
Latvia 0.350 0.025 0.28 43% 70% 14% 16%
Lebanon 0.200 0.275 0.50 65% 15% 42% 42%
Lesotho 0.375 0.175 0.43 44% 20% 45% 35%
Liberia 0.100 0.900 0.65 66% 5% 52% 42%
Lithuania 0.500 0.050 0.27 42% 45% 34% 22%
Macedonia, FYR 0.150 0.050 0.36 44% 58% 16% 25%
Malawi 0.125 0.500 0.58 59% 9% 47% 44%
Malaysia 0.375 0.100 0.36 52% 32% 36% 32%
Maldives 0.175 0.050 0.35 40% 58% 17% 25%
Mali 0.225 0.475 0.57 58% 8% 50% 41%
Mauritania 0.100 0.350 0.54 56% 13% 42% 45%
Mauritius 0.350 0.075 0.34 46% 41% 30% 29%
Mexico 0.650 0.075 0.26 37% 21% 62% 17%
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0.100 0.325 0.53 57% 14% 41% 45%
Moldova 0.300 0.075 0.36 38% 43% 27% 30%
Mongolia 0.175 0.050 0.35 38% 58% 17% 25%
Montenegro 0.425 0.050 0.29 40% 49% 28% 23%
Morocco 0.350 0.050 0.32 35% 52% 23% 24%
Mozambique 0.150 0.300 0.52 52% 15% 42% 44%
Namibia 0.425 0.150 0.40 46% 21% 46% 32%
Nepal 0.250 0.225 0.47 48% 18% 42% 40%
Nicaragua 0.350 0.350 0.52 55% 10% 53% 37%
Niger 0.150 0.800 0.64 65% 6% 53% 42%
Nigeria 0.275 0.200 0.46 48% 20% 41% 39%
Pakistan 0.400 0.100 0.36 38% 31% 38% 31%
Panama 0.325 0.100 0.37 50% 34% 33% 33%
Papua New Guinea 0.225 0.125 0.41 43% 31% 32% 37%
Paraguay 0.150 0.375 0.54 60% 12% 45% 44%
Peru 0.250 0.150 0.43 51% 26% 36% 38%
Philippines 0.100 0.125 0.43 46% 34% 27% 39%
Poland 0.275 0.100 0.38 60% 36% 30% 34%
Romania 0.200 0.025 0.32 43% 74% 10% 16%
Russian Federation 0.275 0.050 0.33 49% 55% 20% 25%
Samoa 0.150 0.150 0.44 49% 28% 32% 40%
Senegal 0.325 0.325 0.51 53% 11% 51% 38%
Serbia 0.225 0.050 0.34 43% 56% 18% 25%
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Solomon Islands 0.225 0.250 0.49 52% 16% 42% 41%
South Africa 0.350 0.050 0.32 40% 52% 23% 24%
Sri Lanka 0.500 0.075 0.31 34% 34% 41% 25%
St. Lucia 0.425 0.100 0.35 45% 30% 40% 30%
Suriname 0.100 0.675 0.62 73% 7% 50% 44%
Swaziland 0.375 0.175 0.43 48% 20% 45% 35%
Syrian Arab Republic 0.300 0.100 0.38 42% 35% 32% 33%
Tajikistan 0.225 0.250 0.49 51% 16% 42% 41%
Tanzania 0.225 0.250 0.49 50% 16% 42% 41%
Thailand 0.425 0.050 0.29 36% 49% 28% 23%
Togo 0.275 0.575 0.59 60% 7% 55% 39%
Tonga 0.250 0.075 0.37 40% 45% 25% 31%
Tunisia 0.500 0.050 0.27 32% 45% 34% 22%
Turkey 0.175 0.100 0.40 56% 38% 26% 35%
Uganda 0.400 0.275 0.48 49% 12% 53% 35%
Ukraine 0.100 0.050 0.37 43% 59% 15% 26%
Uruguay 0.425 0.175 0.42 56% 18% 49% 33%
Uzbekistan 0.175 0.075 0.38 40% 46% 22% 31%
Vanuatu 0.400 0.200 0.44 48% 17% 49% 34%
Venezuela, RB 0.100 0.175 0.46 63% 26% 32% 42%
Vietnam 0.175 0.125 0.42 44% 33% 30% 38%
Yemen, Rep. 0.275 0.525 0.58 61% 7% 54% 39%
Zambia 0.250 0.125 0.41 42% 31% 33% 36%
Sample Median 0.250 0.150 0.43 49% 24% 39% 37%
Typical LDC (Egypt) 0.175 0.200 0.47 52% 22% 37% 42%
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